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Abstract
This paper proposes the Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) model, which unifies the
fragmented literature on design activity. The UDAmodel conceptualises design activity as
a process consisting of three core actions: information action, knowledge-sharing action,
and representation action, which are linked via uncertainty perception. The foundations
of the UDAmodel in the design literature are elaborated in terms of the three core actions
and their links to designer cognition and behaviour, utilising definitions and concepts from
Activity Theory. The practical relevance and theoretical contributions of the UDA model
are discussed. This paper contributes to the design literature by offering a comprehensive
formalisation of design activity of individual designers, which connects cognition and
action, to provide a foundation for understanding previously disparate descriptions of
design activity.
Key words: design activity, information processing, communication, conceptual design,
design theory
1. Introduction
Design activity refers to a complex phenomenon enacted by a designer (Visser
2009; Cash, Hicks & Culley 2015) and connecting information, knowledge (Sim
&Duffy 2003), and object domains (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004). The term itself
has a number of possible definitions and uses in the literature. At its most general,
it has been used to describe the whole process and practice of design with respect
to the organisation (Pahl & Beitz 1996), as well as specific stages or elements in the
product development process e.g. embodiment design (Pugh 1989). Here, activity
is framed with respect to a specific product development goal and describes
organisational behaviours (Wynn & Clarkson 2005). In this context, normative
development processes are driven by organisational rationalisations and decision
making e.g. as in Decision Based Design (Hazelrigg 1998). In contrast, authors
such as Andreasen, Thorp Hansen & Cash (2015) use design activity to describe
the interface between design practice and reflective improvement. Here, the
interaction between an individual’s external behaviour and internal cognition
produces an emergent activity process (Evans & Stanovich 2013). Despite these
differing uses, design activity is predominantly applied with respect to the
designer. For example, Sim&Duffy (2003) describe an individual’s design activity
as a knowledge-based input/output system moderated by the design goal. Hence
1/41
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.28
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 154.16.58.207, on 15 Dec 2017 at 12:58:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
a general definition of design activity is adopted: design activity is a goal directed
systemwhere cognition, behaviour, andmotivation are integrated, with respect to the
‘bringing-into-being’ of a design artefact (Dorst & Cross 2001; Bedny & Karwowski
2004; Cash et al. 2015). This definition builds on Activity Theory (Leont’ev 1981),
which describes human activity as the unity of behaviour and cognition (Bedny
& Karwowski 2004), and explicitly differentiates this work from the terminology
commonly used to describe e.g. normative new product development processes
with respect to the organisation.
Current models of design activity vary widely in terms of the levels and
perspectives they address; from individual mental simulation (e.g. Ball &
Christensen 2009), to overall work processes (e.g. Cardella, Atman & Adams
2006), and from conceptualisation (e.g. Andreasen et al. 2015), to informational
(e.g. Robinson 2010a). These varied perspectives have provided significant
insights into design (Horvath 2004), and form a core focus of design research
(Cross 2007). However, the lack of integration across perspectives and levels has
led to a theoretical fragmentation of the literature (Love 2000, 2002), that must
be addressed in order to further theory building in design (Papalambros 2015).
For example, co-evolution describes fundamental developments in a designer’s
understanding of the problem/solution space (Dorst & Cross 2001), while the
Design Ontology (Storga et al. 2010) describes a range of possible activities, such
as planning and testing, which are themselves distinct from the activities described
by Sim & Duffy (2003). Although all three works deal with aspects of design
activity, their theoretical integration remains unresolved. This raises questions as
to the fundamental nature, drivers for, and components of design activity. Thus,
fragmentation poses a significant challenge for design activity research (Cash
et al. 2015), as well as the design research community more generally (Love 2002;
Papalambros 2015).
Fragmentation of the design activity literature has two main implications
for the field. First, current models typically focus on specific aspects of activity,
such as sketching (Scrivener, Ball & Tseng 2000), without providing a framework
for linking these descriptions to, for example information seeking (Robinson
2010a). Thus, developing a cohesive description of design activity directly
building on a single current model is not possible. This fundamentally limits the
descriptive and predictive power of research claims in this domain. For example,
no single model captures the interaction between designer understanding
(Oxman 1997), the subsequent actions taken (Sim & Duffy 2003), and the
underpinning iterative learning process (Demirbaş & Demirkan 2003), in a single
unitary sense connecting behaviour and cognition (Bedny & Karwowski 2004).
Second, fragmentation hinders theory development with regard to design activity.
Specifically, the lack of a common theoreticalmodel significantly hinders efforts to
integrate, elaborate on, and explain diverse empirical findings (Briggs 2006). This
has been criticised by Love (2000) who highlights the importance of integrative
theory in the design domain. As such, there is a need to unify the fragmented
perspectives on design activity in a new foundational model in order to support
future theoretical and empirical development in the field.
This paper addresses this need by proposing a cohesive model of design
activity. The proposed Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) model conceptualises
overall ‘design activity’ based on a review of existing formalisms described
in the literature. The UDA model describes three core actions: information
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action (dealing with data parts and their manipulation), knowledge-sharing action
(dealing with understanding and its development), and representation action
(dealing with external representations such as sketching). The UDA model links
these core actions throughuncertainty perception,which is defined as: a designers’
perceived lack of understanding with respect to the design task and its context
(Ball et al. 1997; Kreye, Goh & Newnes 2011), and has been shown to connect
some aspects of behaviour and cognition in the design domain (Wiltschnig,
Christensen & Ball 2013; Christensen & Ball 2016a,b). As such, this paper
contributes a comprehensive formalisation of design activity that brings together
prior theoretical and empirical work in the UDA model.
2. Approach
In order to connect disparate research on design activity and unify existing
perspectives an analytical conceptual approach is needed (Wacker 1998). This
links shared elements and underlying theory via logical relationship building
(Barrick, Mount & Li 2013). This relationship building follows a logic-based
approach (Wacker 1998), which delivers new insights by logically developing
relationships between defined concepts to form an internally consistent theory
(Wacker 1998). This section presents this approach in two stages, first identifying
current design activity formalisms to form the basis for initial conceptualisation
i.e. defining the key concepts to be related, and second analysing these formalisms
and their link to the wider activity literature in order to distil the UDA model i.e.
relating the defined concepts to form an internally consistent theory.
2.1. Identifying current formalisms
To identify current formalisms of design activity, a review of relevant publications
in design research was conducted. Specifically, the following journals were
reviewed as a starting point:Design Science,Design Studies, Journal of Engineering
Design (JED), and International Journal of Design (IJD). These journals represent
interdisciplinary design research (Design Science, Design Studies), engineering
design focused research (JED), andmore industrial design focused research (IJD).
Design Studies is the highest impact interdisciplinary design journal, while IJD
and JED are the highest rated journals in their sub-domains. These journals thus
provide the basis for identifying current formalisms of design activity and the
research areas they represent bound the scope of the unification claims reported
in this work.
The keywords used for this review were: theory, model, and framework,
implemented separately via a full text search, from archive start to 2016. This
resulted in 1426 responses for theory, 2007 formodel, and 1042 for framework. All
responses were filtered by the authors based onwhether they explicitly described a
‘formalism’ of design activity. This assessment was based on self-identification by
the original authors of the reviewed papers i.e. the original authors specifically
describe their formalism as a model, theory or framework. For example, the
Design Ontology (Storga et al. 2010) was described by Storga et al. as a potential
framework for understanding product development work. Similarly, the ontology
presented by Sim & Duffy (2003) was self-identified as a system model. Where
works described formalisms fromoutside the design domain the original reference
was followed up and also included in the review. For example, Beylier et al.
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(2009) utilise Markus’ (2001) theory of knowledge reuse. Papers reporting single
variable relationships or empirical results only were excluded at this stage. The
initial inclusion criteria for the review were thus: (1) published in a major design
research journal; (2) explicitly self-identify and describe a formalism (theory,
model, framework) of design activity; (3) excluding single variable relationships or
purely empirical characterisations. This resulted in the initial identification of 66
unique theories, frameworks, or models (henceforth referred to as formalisms for
brevity). Although this list is not exhaustive, sufficient formalisms were reviewed
such that common concepts could be robustly identified.
2.2. Analytical approach
A five-step approach was used to analyse the identified formalisms. First, it was
necessary to establish at what level prior formalisms describe design activity.
This builds on an understanding of human activity as multi-level consisting of
activity, task, and action, linked to cognition (Leont’ev 1981; Bedny & Harris
2005). Activity describes a motivation directed aggregation of lower level ‘tasks’,
which are themselves aggregations of lower level ‘actions’, which connect directly
to human cognition (Bedny & Harris 2005). Here motivation shapes overall
activity, and gives a direction to the system of goals and sub-goals directing
tasks and actions respectively (Leont’ev 1981). Motivation is long-term, situated,
and of varying magnitude. It is possible to hold several motivations at a single
time, such as the simultaneous motivations to design a creative product and
to build a well-working team (Bedny & Harris 2005). Lower level goals and
sub-goals are thus directed bymotivations. Here goals and sub-goals are conscious
conceptualisations of a desired future state (Bedny&Harris 2005). Specifically, the
following definitions were applied in the analysis of existing formalisms based on
Activity Theory (and are subsequently used throughout for consistency):
Activity level : subjectively distinct periods of behaviour associated with
fulfilling a motivation (Leont’ev 1981), which are not temporally distinguished.
As more than one motivation can be simultaneously held by a designer more than
one activity can be progressed at one time, as illustrated by the parallel arrows
at this level in figure 1 (Bedny & Harris 2005). An example activity is creating a
novel design concept.
Task level : temporally and subjectively distinct periods of behaviour, associated
with fulfilling a goal under specific conditions (Leont’ev 1981). Each higher-level
activity can link a number of tasks, but the tasks themselves can only occur
sequentially (Bedny & Harris 2005). An example task is brainstorming ideas on
paper.
Action level : temporally distinct periods of behaviour, associated with
achieving immediate, defined sub-goals linked to completing the overarching
task (Leont’ev 1981; Bedny & Karwowski 2004). Actions form generic building
blocks from which higher-level behaviours (tasks and activities) are composed.
An example action is representing part of an idea via a sketch.
Cognitive level : a continuous process and structured system of processing units
that describes the storage of concepts, propositions, or images etc. as well as the
system of internal mental processes underpinning behaviour (Bedny & Harris
2005). Dominant mental processes also underpin the taxonomic grouping and
classification of actions (Bedny & Harris 2005). An example mental process is
embodied cognition.
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Figure 1. Human activity composed of multiple aggregate levels built on a generic, unitary action/cognition
foundation.
A ‘slice’ through all four levels provides a description of human activity as the
unity of multi-level behaviour and cognition in a given situation (Bedny & Harris
2005), consistent with both cognitive (Bedny &Karwowski 2004) and behavioural
theory (Oliver 1980; Miltenberger 2011). This conceptualisation of activity is
illustrated in figure 1. Here, higher-level activity can be characterised with respect
to unitary building blocks (highlighted in figure 1) at the interface between the
action level and cognition level. These unitary building blocks define core actions,
which interface directly with cognition and are grouped and taxonomically
defined with respect to their dominant cognitive processes (Bedny & Harris
2005). This has two main implications for evaluation of current formalisms of
design activity. First, dominant cognitive processes can be inferred fromdescribed
behaviours (Scaife & Rogers 1996; Wilson 2002) even where such a link is
not characterised or described explicitly. Thus all formalisms describing some
type of action, task or activity were explicitly included in the presented analysis
despite the fact that many of these focus on behavioural rather than unitary (i.e.
connecting behaviour and cognition) descriptions. Second, although it is possible
to infer cognition connected to behaviour the reverse is not necessarily possible.
Formalisms that describe abstract characterisations of the logic underpinning
design or cognitive processes that are only generically associated with behaviour
cannot be linked to specific actions. For example, Hatchuel & Weil’s (2002)
C–K theory characterises reasoning in design and is only generally connected to
behaviour. Thus it cannot be linked to specific actions. Similarly, problem/solution
co-evolution (Dorst & Cross 2001) provides an abstract formalism characterising
understanding development in design but again does not connect to specific
actions. Formalisms that provide only cognitive or abstract logical descriptions
(15 formalisms) were thus excluded from this review because it is not possible
to identify the specific unitary ‘action/cognition’ building blocks necessary for a
unifying model of design activity. This follows the focus on activity as the unity of
behaviour and cognition and introduces a fourth inclusion criterion: formalisms
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explicitly describe design behaviour or behaviour and cognition in a single model.
Thus 51 formalisms were taken forward into the initial analysis (Section 3.1).
In the second step, the identified formalisms from Step 1 were examined in
more depth on the action level.When existing formalisms did not explicitly define
actions, the articles were further examined to identify the actions underpinning
the model. This resulted in a diverse list of specific action sub-types. Formalisms
were analysed at the action level for three main reasons. First, actions directly
interface with cognition, and can be generically classified in terms of each action’s
dominant cognitive process (Bedny & Karwowski 2004). For example, gesture
and sketching are distinct behaviours but can both be understood in terms of the
representational aspects of external or embodied cognition (Scaife & Rogers 1996;
Wilson 2002), and thus can be conceptualised as specific instantiations of a generic
representation action (Bedny & Karwowski 2004). This allows for a unifying
understanding across the diverse descriptions found in the design literature.
Second, the action level provides the foundation upon which the higher aggregate
levels of task and activity are built (Bedny & Harris 2005). These higher levels
connect strings of actions in any number of sequential configurations dependent
on the subject and situation. Finally, actions can be described as a self-regulating
system where the individual progresses through a cycle from formulating the goal
and assessing its conditions, deciding on and executing the action, and evaluating
the outcome to generate a new sub-goal formulation (Engeström 2000). This
links to characterisations of behaviour and cognition, critical to understanding
causation in this context (Oliver 1980; Miltenberger 2011). Thus, it is possible
to cohesively connect diverse descriptions of design activity, at the action level
via generic actions, consistent with underlying theories of activity, behaviour, and
cognition (Leont’ev 1981; Miltenberger 2011).
In the third step, core actions were identified by clustering the specific
action sub-types from Step 2 with respect to the dominant cognitive processes
explicitly or implicitly linked to the action in the reviewed formalisms. This
assessment was based on the logic that actions provide independently observable
and generic building blocks suitable for identifying similarities between
formalisms (Engeström 2000; Bedny & Karwowski 2004), and can be grouped
and taxonomically classified with respect to their dominant cognitive processes
(Bedny & Harris 2005). Where action sub-types were described purely in terms
of behaviour with no explicitly suggested cognitive process, possible dominant
cognitive processes were established based on additional literature describing
the action sub-type. Thus each action found to be generic and common across
formalisms i.e. core, were explored in depth. This enabled us to establish three
core actions, which can provide a unifying understanding of design activity.
In the fourth step, connections were identified between the three core actions
identified in Step 3. These connections were required because a ‘comprehensive’
model of activity consists of the following elements with respect to the self-
regulating action system (Oliver 1980; Engeström 2000; Miltenberger 2011):
antecedent i.e. the cause or driver for an action, behaviour i.e. the external action
itself, and consequence i.e. evaluation of the outcome. The identified core actions
provide the behavioural elements and connections between these elements can be
established via an antecedent/consequence mechanism. Antecedent/consequence
thus forms the specific causal mechanism for the three core actions by defining
how they interact with cognition to form a self-regulating system where goal
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outcomes can be evaluated (Engeström 2000). Such self-regulation typically
links basic cognitive (Evans 2008) and metacognitive processes (Schraw &
Dennison 1994). While basic cognitive processes are connected directly to action,
metacognitive processes allow an individual to evaluate the limitations of their
current knowledge or understanding as well as regulate basic cognitive processes
(Schraw & Dennison 1994). Metacognitive processes thus form a key bridge
from a purely behaviour/cognitive model to one that can account for memory,
knowledge, and understanding because they provide knowledge about cognition.
They account for individuals’ understanding of their own knowledge state, which
forms a key part of design co-evolution (Dorst & Cross 2001). Metacognition
further regulates basic cognitive processes and can thus provide a platform
for connecting diverse core actions in a single model (Schraw & Dennison
1994). Metacognitive processes have further been demonstrated as important to
directing design activity in prior empirical research (Ball & Christensen 2009).
Thus, while each core action must be connected to a dominant cognitive process,
a metacognitive antecedent/consequence mechanism is needed to link these core
actions.
In the fifth step, the core actions were combined with cognitive and
metacognitive processes in a conceptual model to fulfil the research aim. This
brings together and connects core actions via common causal mechanisms,
consistent with fundamental theories of human activity (Bedny & Harris 2005;
Miltenberger 2011) and prior understanding of design activity. Thus, although
each element in the model draws from extant literature the final model offers
a novel conceptualisation of those elements. This provides a unifying model of
design activity and a foundation for future design activity research.
The five steps are reported as follows: Steps 1 and 2 in Section 3.1, Step 3 in
Sections 3.2–3.4, Step 4 in Section 4, and Step 5 in Section 5.
3. Existing formalisms of design activity
In this section, the core actions are first distilled from the reviewed formalisms
before they are individually explored in more detail with respect to the wider
design and activity literatures.
3.1. Overview and scope of current formalisms
The 51 identified formalisms are summarised in Table 1, where they are grouped
with respect to their constituent core actions. This grouping was not assumed
a priori and is for table clarity only. Table 1 outlines the formalisms’ general
view on design activity as well as each of the specific action sub-types they
describe. Each action sub-type is labelled with respect to its core action, again
for clarity: information action (I), knowledge-sharing action (KS), representation
action (R). In addition, for each formalism, the cognitive process associated with
action is highlighted (labelled as Cog in Table 1). This is either explicit i.e. the
original authors state their perspective on the link to cognition with respect to
a defined cognitive process (highlighted in bold in Table 1) or implicit i.e. a
cognitive process is inferred from the authors’ writing, referencing, and behaviour
descriptions because no explicit statement is given. For example, Kavakli & Gero
(2001) describe external cognition as the foundation of their work, and cite
other papers where this cognitive process has been explicitly highlighted although
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Table 1. Overview of formalisms associated with design activity, categorised with respect to their related core actions
Name Where used General view on activity and cognition Specific action sub-types described
Information action
Applied axiomatic
design
(Suh 1998; Thielman &
Ge 2006)
Activity underpinned by axioms: independence
and information
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Structure information w.r.t. functional v.
physical domains; populate information in
structure; evaluate the information structure;
optimise the information structure
CoMoDe (Gonnet, Henning &
Leone 2007)
Design objects are developed through
informational actions
Cog: implicit information processing
I:Model design as information system; generate
data about the design; evaluate data
Context, activities,
and support data
(Beylier et al. 2009) Activity as an objective driven information
process within a project context
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Analysis; formulation of assumptions; criteria
specification; characterisation of materials;
modelling; specification of boundary conditions;
application of loads; analysis processing;
post-processing results; checking and controlling;
answering the customer by comparing objects
and data
Knowledge
management in
engineering design
(McMahon, Lowe &
Culley 2004)
Process connecting information (from
products, systems, staff, and processes)
and expertise
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Information query; filtering/routing; retrieval;
browsing
Knowledge-sharing action
Search for ideas in
associative memory
(Liikkanen & Perttula
2010)
Mechanisms of idea production as a memory-
based activity drawing on knowledge
Cog: explicit memory-based cognition
KS: Idea generation
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Table 1. (continued)
Conversation theory (Dong 2005; Pask
1975)
Knowledge construction occurs through
conversations where knowledge is made
explicit
Cog: explicit group cognition
KS: Knowledge shared via conversation
Teammental model
theory
(Dong, Kleinsmann &
Deken 2013)
Team members use knowledge to realise
actions consistent and congruent with their
team
Cog: explicit group cognition
KS: Naming – judging and expressing perception
of importance; moving – developing the concept
and sharing ideas; reflecting – questioning the
direction they have taken
Theory of dynamic
memory
(Oxman 1990) Knowledge structures support the process of
explanatory thinking underpinning design
Cog: explicit knowledge-based cognition
KS: Analogising; cross-indexing; matching to
prior knowledge
Activity model of
product development
(Fairlie-Clarke &
Muller 2003)
List of activities associated with the business
process, part of a more general ontology
Cog: implicit social cognition
KS: Develop company strategy; set company
objectives and develop operational plan; execute
company operations; control outcome of
company operations
Communication
activities
(Medland 1992) Hierarchical description of communication
activity, problem handling, and truth
development
Cog: implicit social cognition
KS: Delegation; reporting; awareness spreading;
problem reporting
Community of
practice
(Kanstrup 2014) Joint activities and joint understanding link
people in developing skills
Cog: implicit social cognition
KS: Sharing of interests; engagement in shared
activity; negotiation; developing shared tools,
experiences, languages, and processes9/41
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Table 1. (continued)
Knowledge
management systems
(Markus 2001) Knowledge contributors, knowledge
intermediaries, knowledge seekers
Cog: implicit social cognition
KS: Formalising knowledge; elicitation;
dissemination; search for or reuse content
from a knowledge management system
Representation action
Function-
behaviour-structure
framework
(Gero &
Kannengiesser 2004)
Actions framed with respect to interaction
between external and internal worlds
Cog: explicit experiential cognition
R: Formulation; synthesis; analysis; evaluation;
documentation; reformulation
Fixation (Viswanathan et al.
2014)
Understanding and context linked to
knowledge sharing and staging, as well as
experience
Cog: explicit embodied cognition
R: Idea manifestation
Thought–language
model
(Fox 1981) Conscious and unconscious processing
of sensation with respect to the external
expression of language
Cog: explicit thought/language cognition
R: External expression via language as well as
physical media
Design creativity
and understanding
of objects
(Daley 1982) Linking visual schema, linguistic schema, and
value structures with conscious propositional
knowledge
Cog: explicit embodied cognition
R: External expression
Re-representation (Oxman 1997) Re-representation: externalisation of
knowledge structures via representations
Cog: explicit embodied cognition
R: Externalisation of knowledge structures in
representations; sketching; drawing
Long/short term
and Visio-spatial
working memory
(Bilda & Gero 2007) Cognition underpinned by working memory
linked to representation via visio-spatial
working memory
Cog: explicit external cognition
R: Sketching; drawing
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Table 1. (continued)
An integrated
generative design
framework
(Singh & Gu 2012) Evaluation, representation, generation, and
performance are interconnected
Cog: explicit experiential cognition
R: External representation
Creative segment
theory
(Sun et al. 2014) Idea generation, idea expression, and visual
feedback loop
Cog: implicit embodied cognition
R: Sketching; drawing objects; drawing objects
from another perspective; drawing context;
drawing annotations; overstriking
Imitative and
constructive
simulation
(Taura et al. 2012) Design thinking based on external and
internally observed data
Cog: implicit embodied cognition
R: Dealing with words; dealing with images;
constructive simulation
Fundamental creative
planning loop
(Hertz 1992) Registration> synthesis> creation, and
feedback via synthesis > expression > sensing
> registration
Cog: implicit embodied cognition
R: Physical expression
Perceptual crossing (Deckers et al. 2012) Subject, object, and event are linked via activity
and reciprocal perception
Cog: implicit embodied cognition
R: Perceiving perceptive activity of people;
perceiving perceptive activity of object;
perceiving presence; perceiving action; perceiving
expressivity
The design situation
represented by a
systematic grammar
(McDonnell 1997) Situation defined as: initialmotivation, context,
design proposal, development strategy, and
security constraints
Cog: implicit experiential cognition
R: External proposition; interpretation
Two-search model
of design problem
solving
(Liu 1996) Designer uses a shape restructuring search then
a knowledge transforming search iteratively
Cog: implicit embodied cognition
R: Pre-attending; attending; encoding;
pattern-matching; rule application11/41
at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.28
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. IP address: 154.16.58.207, on 15 D
ec 2017 at 12:58:58, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available
Table 1. (continued)
Theory of mental
imagery
(Kavakli & Gero 2001;
Kosslyn et al. 1984)
Mental imagery and perception are connected
to physical activity
Cog: implicit external cognition
R: Drawing; looking; moves
Design
representation
schema
(Cardella et al. 2006) Common representation activities associated
with different design process stages
Cog: implicit external cognition
R: Read text; deal with diagram; write text;
sketch; modelling
Rational problem
solving/reflection in
action
(Dorst & Dijkhuis
1995)
Designer as an information processor/designer
reflecting through action
Cog: implicit information
processing/experiential cognition
R:Write; sketch/drawing action; gesture
Information and Knowledge-sharing actions
Theory of collective
cognition
(Kleinsmann et al.
2012)
People build shared mental models via:
accumulate> interact> examine>
accommodate
Cog: explicit collective cognition
I: Retrieving; structuring; filtering; storing
KS: Exchanging; negotiating; evaluating;
interpreting; integration; deciding; acting
Coordination theory (Suss & Thomson
2012)
Dependencies between activities and resources
create problems that constrain subsequent
activity
Cog: explicit coordinated information
processing
I:Work; read; store
KS: Prepare; review
Information
processing theory
(Aurisicchio, Bracewell
& Wallace 2013)
Information work and knowledge sharing
linked to problem solving and bounded
rationality
Cog: explicit information processing/external
cognition
I: Information; analysis; evaluation
KS: Confirmation; comparison; constructive
generation; explanatory generation12/41
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Table 1. (continued)
Information driven
design activities
(Wild et al. 2010) Information actions from analysis and seeking
to learning, manipulation, and archiving
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Feasibility study; analysis; testing; information
gathering; informing; documenting
KS: Training
Design activity (Wang et al. 2013) Activity as a system (task) with input/output,
resources, and goals
Cog: implicit experiential cognition
I: Information dependency
KS: Knowledge dependency
The blackboard
framework for
behaviour
(Whitefield &Warren
1989)
Knowledge sources communicate with a
central ‘blackboard’ data structure
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Information structure
KS: Knowledge exchange
Accessing
information for
engineering design
(Macleod, McGregor &
Hutton 1994)
Requirements drive a process where human
knowledge and external information are
integrated
Cog: implicit information processing
I:Dealing with external information; dealing with
requirement specification
KS: Dealing with human knowledge
Collaborative design
taxonomy
(Ostergaard &
Summers 2009)
Dependencies between team, communication,
information, approach, and problem
Cog: implicit social cognition
I: Inform; request; record
KS: Commit; guide; express; decide; propose;
respond
Design Ontology and
Merged Ontology of
Engineering Design
(Ahmed & Storga
2009; Storga et al.
2010)
Ontologies of activity in terms of its
information and knowledge characteristics
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Dealing with abstract attributes; dealing with
abstract relations; dealing with the physical object
KS: Dealing with the physical process
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Table 1. (continued)
Category framework
for design behaviour
(Peeters et al. 2007) Framework splitting activity into design
creation, design planning, and design
cooperation
Cog: implicit information processing/social
cognition
I: Gathering information
KS: Establishing the design goal; generating ideas
and solutions; elaborating the design;
restricting/combining solutions; establishing the
concept; phase transition; reflecting on the
design; adjusting based on reflection; planning
time; establishing responsibilities per discipline;
keeping schedule; evaluating the schedule, use of
time, or meeting of responsibilities; adjusting the
schedule, use of time, or responsibilities based on
evaluation; making arrangements about the
cooperation within the team; cooperation;
evaluating the cooperation; adjusting the
cooperation based on evaluation;
communication; making decisions; documenting
decisions
Modelling
production
management
(Moscoso 2007) Activity in a wider process linked to resources,
structures, processes, KPI’s and capabilities
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Preparation; planning
KS: Controlling; process re-engineering;
documentation of best practices
Engineering
workflow model
(Rouibah & Caskey
2003)
Activity has a role, executing resource, and
triggering event
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Link data
KS: Link people
Design activity
schema
(Cardella et al. 2006) Common actions in a design process
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Gather information; feasibility analysis;
evaluation; calculate
KS: Identify need; define problem; generate ideas;
decision; communication
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Table 1. (continued)
Ontology of generic
engineering design
activities
(Sim & Duffy 2003) Ontology of design activity as a knowledge-
based input/output system linked to a design
goal
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Abstracting; associating; composing;
decomposing; defining; detailing; standardising;
structuring/integrating; synthesising; analysing;
evaluating; selecting; information gathering;
searching; simulating; testing/experimenting;
modelling
KS: Generating; decision making; constraining;
exploring; identifying; planning; prioritising;
resolving; selecting; scheduling
Activity-based
modelling approach
(Ge &Wang 2007) Activity is fundamental linked to information
flow in the wider group context
Cog: implicit information processing/social
cognition
I: Input information; output information
KS: Share information; process in the group;
identification and internalisation of information
across a stakeholder group
Information and Representation actions
Autogenetic design
theory
(Vajna et al. 2005) Development through evaluation, selection,
replication, recombination, and mutation
Cog: implicit information processing
I: Research; information seeking
R: Evaluation, selection; replication;
recombination; mutation
Spectrum of design
activity
(Pugh 1989) Activity space spanning
innovatory–conventional in terms of synthesis
and expansion of options
Cog: implicit information processing
I:Market analysis; specification
R: Conceptualisation; Computer aided detailed
design;
Knowledge-sharing and Representation actions
External memory (Van Der Lugt 2005) Internal memory is externalised in the design
which then feeds a shared external memory
Cog: explicit external cognition
KS: Individual external memory; shared external
memory
R: Verbalisation; gesture; sketching; physical
representation
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Table 1. (continued)
Experiential
learning theory
(Demirbaş &
Demirkan 2003)
Iterative learning: experience > observation >
abstract conceptualisation> experimentation
Cog: explicit experiential cognition
KS: Sharing experience
R: Analysing the situation; experimentation;
reflecting;
Multimodal
communication
(Eris, Martelaro &
Badke-Schaub 2014)
Mental models are externalised through
representations to form shared understanding
Cog: explicit group cognition/embodied
cognition
KS: Expression, negotiation, identification of
differences; integration of viewpoints
R: Draw; write; talk; gesture; storing ideas;
conveying information; representing ideas;
engaging attention
Design as problem
solving
(Jonas 1993) Perception and thus problem/solution
knowledge result from activity
Cog: implicit information processing
KS: Communication
R: Perception from ‘activity’
Fixation (Crilly 2015) Idea generation is affected by context as well as
prototyping and learning
Cog: implicit experiential cognition
KS: Idea generation; education; training
R: Prototyping
Macroscopic analysis
of design processes
(Suwa, Purcell & Gero
1998)
Activity in terms of physical, perceptual,
functional, and conceptual
Cog: implicit external cognition
KS: Explore issues of interaction between
artefacts and people; consider psychological
reactions
of people; make preferential and aesthetic
evaluations; set up goals; retrieve knowledge;
organise or compare elements
R:Make depictions; look previous depictions;
other physical actions; attend to visual features;
attend to spatial relations16/41
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they themselves do not define an explicit theory of cognition. The 51 identified
formalisms were evaluated with regard to the level of their descriptions (based on
Figure 1), the characterisations of the action level, and in terms of the processes
they describe.
Evaluating the formalisms in terms of level, it was found that current
formalisms collectively describe a wide range of specific activities, tasks, and
actions. No current formalism describes the full interaction across all levels
necessary for understanding design activity completely (Figure 1). For example,
one of the most extensive formalisms provided by Sim & Duffy (2003) touches
on representation but does not deal with sketching, gesture or many of the other
representation sub-types. Current formalisms typically focus on the activity or
task level, and deal with the designer, their surroundings, underlying cognition,
and aggregate activity, but few connect generic actions and their dominant
cognitive processes. Further, formalisms offer a large breadth in descriptions of
specific action sub-types, ranging from general ‘external or physical expression’
(Hertz 1992; Singh & Gu 2012) to highly detailed breakdowns of representational
gesture, sketching, drawing, and writing (Suwa et al. 1998; Sun et al. 2014).
Descriptions vary in perspectives on the processes underpinning activity and
do not deal with core actions able to support wider unification and connection
across formalisms. For example, Conversation Theory (Pask 1975) focuses on
knowledge sharing via language and does not provide for integrating information
or representation actions such as those outlined by Vajna et al. (2005) or Sun et al.
(2014). Thus, current formalisms do not provide a basis for unification across
levels, based on core actions.
Evaluating existing formalisms on the action level, stark differenceswere found
with regard to described sub-types and their links. No single formalism covered
all action sub-types or provided a framework able to synthesise the wide range
of descriptions in the literature. This can be partially attributed to the fact that
most reviewed formalisms (Table 1) describe design activity disconnected from
cognition. Of 51 formalisms only 17 offer some description of the link between
action and an explicitly framed cognitive process (Table 1). For example, while
the Design Ontology (Storga et al. 2010) provides an excellent overview of specific
information and knowledge-sharing action sub-types, these are described in
behavioural terms without being explicitly linked to a cognitive process. Similarly,
Moscoso (2007) focuses on actions with respect to the manufacturing process,
and thus provides behavioural descriptionswithout connecting these to cognition.
While this general focus on behaviour does not diminish the contribution of the
listed formalisms, it does mean that no current formalism is suitable for providing
a unifying model of design activity.
Evaluating the formalisms in terms of the processes they describe it was
found that most formalisms tend to either describe the antecedent for action
or action itself but not both. For example, co-evolution offers detailed insight
into the underpinning drivers for action (Dorst & Cross 2001), but does not
connect this to a fully realised framework of activity. Similarly, Sim & Duffy
(2003) and Storga et al. (2010) detail specific action sub-types but do not tie them
to cognitive and metacognitive processes in terms of antecedent/consequence.
Thus current characterisation of design activity, built on a self-regulating system
connecting core actions and cognition, is incomplete (Oliver 1980; Engeström
2000; Miltenberger 2011). This initial analysis results in three distinct limitations
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preventing the development of a unifying model of design activity based on
current formalisms:
(1) Lack of cohesive theoretical description of aggregate activity built on core
actions linked to cognition.
(2) Lack of common and generic core actions able to connect the varied
descriptions of design activity currently found in the literature.
(3) Incomplete theoretical description from antecedent-to-consequence
connecting core actions and cognition.
Due to these limitations, it was necessary to identify core actions that enable
unification of design activity. This was done in four phases. First, all explicit
cognitive processes were clustered based on common theoretical elements. For
example, a cluster of explicit cognitive processes could be identified by their
common focus on describing processes where mental structures are externally
represented, whether formalised as external cognition, embodied cognition
or experiential cognition. This resulted in three clusters: information-based
cognition including coordinated information processing (Suss & Thomson 2012),
and information processing (Aurisicchio et al. 2013), knowledge-based (group)
cognition including memory-based cognition (Liikkanen & Perttula 2010),
group cognition (Pask 1975; Dong 2005; Dong et al. 2013; Eris et al. 2014),
and collective cognition (Kleinsmann et al. 2012), and representation-based
embodied cognition including external cognition (Van Der Lugt 2005; Bilda &
Gero 2007; Aurisicchio et al. 2013), embodied cognition (Daley 1982; Oxman
1997; Viswanathan et al. 2014), experiential cognition (Demirbaş & Demirkan
2003; Gero & Kannengiesser 2004; Singh & Gu 2012), and thought/language
cognition (Fox 1981; Eris et al. 2014).
Second, the specific action sub-types associated with these three clusters
were grouped using explicitly connected formalisms in order to distil core
actions characterised by these dominant cognitive processes. For example,
the specific action sub-types associated with the initial ‘representation-
based embodied cognition’ cluster included formulation, synthesis, analysis,
evaluation, documentation, reformulation, language-based representation,
physical representation, idea manifestation, external expression, sketching,
drawing, gesture, physically storing ideas, physically conveying information,
representing ideas, and physically engaging attention (Table 1). Based on this
an initial definition was developed for a core action of representation able to
accommodate each of these specific action sub-types with respect to a common
dominant cognitive process.
Third, this initial core action definition was evaluated with respect to all
formalisms that implicitly connected to representation-based embodied cognition,
and their associated specific action sub-types. Again these action sub-types were
listed and incorporated into the core action conceptualisation where they could
be connected to the underlying cognitive process. Where action sub-types did
not fit with the underlying cognitive process connected a specific core action,
they were compared with other cognitive process clusters. This was the case with,
for example, Vajna et al. (2005), where the action sub-types: evaluation, selection,
replication, recombination, and mutation, were all framed within the original text
as representation-based actions but were analogous to actions described with
respect to formalisms explicitly connected to information-based cognition. This
18/41
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.28
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 154.16.58.207, on 15 Dec 2017 at 12:58:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
resulted in the identification of a set of action sub-types for each of the three
cognitive process clusters.
Fourth, the sets of action sub-types were synthesised through a definition of
the core action. These definitions were evaluated iteratively to eliminate possible
overlap in action sub-types. This process resulted in three core action definitions
based on the reviewed formalisms in Table 1: information action, knowledge-
sharing action, and representation action. These core actions bring together the
various formalisms from the literature in terms of common cognitive processes.
We propose the three core actions as a foundation for connecting current
formalisms of design activity. However, despite the review and distillation of the
core actions reported in this section, further refinement is still required due to the
lack of definitive descriptions in the existing literature, the high variety of action
sub-type descriptions, and relative lack of explicit links to dominant cognitive
processes. The review was thus expanded to include the wider design literature
where there are many empirical works not described with respect to a specific
formalism. For example, Wasiak et al. (2010) provide an extensive list of specific
action sub-types associatedwith information action,without explicitly connecting
to a formalised model of design activity or to a specific cognitive process. The
specific logic underpinning this expanded review is to establish the nature and
scope of the core actions and their sub-types in the empirical design literature. This
elaboration is necessary to ensure the robustness of the core actions by contrasting
and integrating these additional works. Thus the nature of the core actions and
their connection with the design and activity literatures via dominant cognitive
process and a commonmetacognitive process is explored in the following sections,
which expand the scope of the original review.
3.2. Information action
Information action can be defined as dealing with data parts and their
manipulation (Court 1997). This type of action is associated with cognitive
processes describing how data parts are identified, manipulated, and transformed
into information and subsequent knowledge (Wilson 1999). This includes the
collection, recording, reviewing, and filing of data parts (Blandin & Brown 1977)
via various means including human and non-human (Robinson 2010a), formal
and informal (Fidel &Green 2004). This type of action and its associated cognitive
process deal with data parts detached from an individual’s beliefs (Belkin, Oddy
& Brooks 1982; Song, Van Der Bij & Weggeman 2005). It has been shown to
be a distinct and important action within design work (Cave & Noble 1986;
Puttre 1991), accounting for a significant portion of engineers’ and designers’
time (Court 1997; Robinson 2010a). Further, identification and selection of data
parts plays a critical role in ideation and design creativity (Gonçalves, Cardoso
& Badke-Schaub 2016). Some authors even characterise design primarily as an
information transformation process where data parts are sought, reasoned about,
and stored, via e.g. seeking and requesting (Aurisicchio, Bracewell &Wallace 2010;
Wasiak et al. 2010).
Information action has been generally characterised in terms of: finding
data parts > reasoning about/validating > using (Belkin et al. 1982); driven by
perceived need – connected to its role (Belkin et al. 1982). For example, Wasiak
et al. (2010) and Cash, Hicks & Culley (2013) characterise information action
in the design process in terms of its role e.g. solving. However, research has
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typically focused on sources and media, such as the internet (Oh, Oh & Shah
2009), or on aggregate information action with little link to design work, such as
total information acquisition (Hult, Ketchen & Slater 2004). Thus although basic
taxonomies of information action, such as that by Belkin et al. (1982), do exist, and
have been included in manifest descriptions such as those offered by Robinson
(2010b) or Cash et al. (2015), they have not been theoretically integrated with
other core actions e.g. representation (Scaife & Rogers 1996).
Two main observations emerge from the literature on information action.
First, new information is processed through reasoning or learning. It is then
structured, and evaluated through experience (Tracey &Hutchinson 2016) before
entering the ‘human belief system’ (Song et al. 2005) to create knowledge. Thus
information action must be distinguished from action related to knowledge
sharing. Second, information action is connected to designers’ understanding
of a situation via their perceived need (Borlund 2003). This has been linked
to designer uncertainty perception by Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub (2011).
Here, designers seek to resolve their uncertainty perception via information
action including seeking, gathering, and reasoning about data parts (Kim & Lee
2016). This increases their understanding and thus gradually reduces uncertainty
perception over time (Yu et al. 2016). The link between uncertainty perception and
information action stems back to describing design as a decision making process
under uncertainty (Beheshti 1993) where design progresses as design-related
decisions aremade and implemented (Wilson 1999; Suss &Thomson 2012). Thus,
uncertainty perception forms a key motivator of information action described in
the design literature. Thus, one key mechanism driving information action is the
designer’s aim to reduce their uncertainty perception.
3.3. Knowledge-sharing action
Knowledge-sharing action can be defined as dealing with the creation and
development of shared understanding (Dong 2005). This type of action is
associated with cognitive processes describing how knowledge is expressed with
respect to an individual’s understanding and beliefs (Court 1997; Chiu, Hsu &
Wang 2006), as well as the structural (i.e. social), relational, and procedural (i.e.
shared language or vision) context of an action (Song et al. 2005; Chiu et al.
2006). Thus these actions and their associated cognitive process are fundamentally
linked to an individual’s own understanding and beliefs, distinguishing them from
information action (Song et al. 2005; Chiu et al. 2006). Knowledge-sharing action
forms a critical part of idea sharing (Liikkanen & Perttula 2010), group creativity
(Christensen & Ball 2016a,b), group learning (Shull et al. 2004), is underpinned
by effective communication (Preston, Karahanna & Rowe 2006), and is often
directed towards iteratively grounding shared understanding (Clark & Brennan
1991) where individuals seek to establish that shared knowledge is actually
understood as intended. Thus knowledge-sharing action is characterised by its
often discursive nature (Deken et al. 2012) where exchanges bring together, fact,
rationale, context, varied perspectives, and exploration (Eris 2002; Aurisicchio
et al. 2010). For example, Eris (2002) describes 22 specific types of question,
while Aurisicchio et al. (2010) categorise knowledge-sharing requests with respect
to their objective e.g. comparison, their subject e.g. product or process, and
their response type e.g. retrieval of information. Further, knowledge-sharing
action underpins collaborative creative efforts where exchange fosters knowledge
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acquisition and creation within a group (Shull et al. 2004), as highlighted in the
recent work of Sauder & Jin (2016).
Knowledge-sharing action connects to design formalisms at all levels of
description (Maznevski & Chudoba 2000; Dong 2005). However, research has
typically focused on understanding knowledge sharing in terms of its role in
the development of shared understanding (Preston et al. 2006; Kleinsmann &
Valkenburg 2008), or its manifestation through various communicative media
(Cash & Maier 2016). For example, Maznevski & Chudoba (2000) explore
team effectiveness in relation to communication intensity; while Aurisicchio
et al. (2010) highlight the need to support designers in sharing and capturing
knowledge. No single taxonomy of knowledge-sharing action is completely
accepted (Eris 2002; Aurisicchio, Bracewell & Wallace 2006), and despite the
fundamentality of knowledge sharing (Fairlie-Clarke & Muller 2003) it has not
been formalised in generic terms or with respect to its relationship with the other
core actions.
Two main observations emerge from the literature on knowledge-sharing
action. First, it is critically linked to the development of shared understanding
(Kleinsmann&Valkenburg 2008). For example, Conversation Theory (Pask 1975)
describes the gradual development of alignment in understanding expressed
in terms of semantic coherence in word use, as illustrated in design by Dong
(2005). Although this is also linked to a number of wider social processes (Busby
2001; Chiu et al. 2006), shared context (Humayun & Gang 2013), and quality
of communication (Maznevski & Chudoba 2000), the development of shared
understanding is a core characteristic of successful design teams (Dong 2005).
It is important to note that although knowledge-sharing action is typically part
of an interpersonal exchange it can also be captured in asynchronous modes,
where the addressee is unknown or simply imagined, such as in personal letters or
journals (Clark & Brennan 1991; McAlpine, Cash & Hicks 2017). Thus, although
this is a core part of team interaction, the actions themselves are undertaken by
the individual. Second, knowledge-sharing action can refer to vision and identity
(Chiu et al. 2006), concept understanding (Dong 2005), solution understanding
(Preston et al. 2006), and understanding of organisational elements e.g. team roles
(Kleinsmann & Valkenburg 2008). Here, uncertainty perception is particularly
connected to others’ understanding of these elements as a driver for knowledge
sharing in practice (Clark & Brennan 1991; Deken et al. 2012). Similarly the
population of knowledge spaces e.g. problem/solution in co-evolution (Dorst
& Cross 2001), can be related to uncertainty perception via the work of Kreye
et al. (2011) and Christensen & Ball (2016a,b) who connect knowledge sharing,
uncertainty perception, and underlying cognitive processes. Here, uncertainty
perception is again characterised as a general metacognitive process which drives
knowledge-sharing action.
3.4. Representation action
Representation action can be defined as dealing with the perception and
manipulation of external representations of information (Scaife & Rogers 1996;
Wilson 2002). This type of action is associated with cognitive processes describing
the interplay between internal and external representations (Scaife & Rogers
1996; Wiltschnig et al. 2013). Representation action is often associated with
knowledge structures and the exploration of the design space (Dorst & Cross
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2001; Hatchuel & Weil 2003), and provides a cognitively economic means of
externalising ideas (Brun, Le Masson & Weil 2016). This has been described
via formalisms such as external (Scaife & Rogers 1996) and embodied (Wilson
2002) cognition, where an individual uses the interplay between internal/external
representations to directly support cognition and develop understanding (Scaife
& Rogers 1996;Wiltschnig et al. 2013). Representations have also been referred to
as simulation in the design literature (Taura et al. 2012; Wiltschnig et al. 2013), as
such, representation is adopted here for clarity. Specifically, representation actions
deal with external representations e.g. prototyping or computational modelling,
distinct from internal mental simulation as described by Wiltschnig et al. (2013).
The importance of representation action is highlighted in numerous contexts
e.g. via gesture (Cash & Maier 2016), prototyping (Sanders & Stappers 2014), or
sketching (Schön &Wiggins 1992).
Representation action has beenwidely acknowledged as central to designwork
(Sim & Duffy 2003; Horvath 2004; Andreasen et al. 2015). In particular, research
in this area has focused on understanding and describing representation (Dorst
& Vermaas 2005), its relationship to reasoning about design (Dorst & Cross 2001;
Hatchuel &Weil 2003), and how it is realised in practice (Kan, Gero &Tang 2011).
For example, Kulkarni et al. (2000) examine how collaborative sketching can
support idea generation/manifestation and joint representation in teams. Further,
specific aspects of representation action have again been connected to uncertainty
perception. For example, Gursoy & Ozkar (2015) show how penmanship and
sketching help to reveal and resolve uncertainty perception while Scrivener et al.
(2000) connect sketching and uncertainty perception explicitly in two ways: first,
uncertainty perception forms a trigger for strategic shiftswithin sketching; second,
sketching can engender uncertainty perception by elucidating differences between
the drawing and the designer’s own understanding andmemory. Similarly, Gerber
& Carroll (2012) highlight how prototyping also helps to elicit and resolve
uncertainty perception, by allowing individuals to iteratively build knowledge and
promote a sense of control. However, the centrality of representation action and
its interconnectionwith information action and knowledge-sharing action are not
fully captured in current design activity formalisms (Table 1).
Two main observations emerge from the literature on representation
action. First, like descriptions of information or knowledge-sharing action,
representation is typically described as a multi-faceted phenomenon, linking the
design artefact (Gero 1990), the specific knowledge being represented (Storga
et al. 2010), physical modality (Schön & Wiggins 1992), and model granularity
(Maier, Eckert & Clarkson 2017). Thus representation action is closely linked to
knowledge sharing. For example, representational gesturing can both facilitate
individual understanding via external cognition, and the development of team
shared understanding through e.g. mirroring and modification (Stempfle &
Badke-Schaub 2002; Cash & Maier 2016). Second, representation is linked to
improved understanding and ability to communicate within a team (Schön &
Wiggins 1992; Scaife & Rogers 1996) e.g. by supporting the Concept–Knowledge
interaction (Hatchuel & Weil 2003). Here, uncertainty perception is modified
via representation surrounding the design artefact as illustrated by the work of
Gerber & Carroll (2012) who describe uncertainty perception as a driver for
representation action. Thus representation action is again linked to the driver:
designer uncertainty perception.
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4. Linking the three core actions through uncertainty
perception
The three core actions identified and described in Section 3 conceptualise the
unitary building blocks upon which a foundational understanding of design
activity can be built. To link these unitary building blocks, ametacognitive element
is needed (Section 2), suitable for connecting multiple cognitive processes, and
thus connecting the three core actions. Key literature associated with each core
action e.g. Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub (2011) and Gerber & Carroll (2012),
suggests that uncertainty perception forms a suitable metacognitive process for
this purpose. Other possible concepts could be ambiguity (Ellsberg 2001) or risk
attitudes (Davies 2006); however, uncertainty perception is the concept most
commonly described in the metacognitive literature (Schraw & Dennison 1994;
Christensen & Ball 2016a,b) and had been described in relation to each of the
three core actions within the design literature. As such, this section explores the
potential for uncertainty perception to connect the core actions via a consistent
antecedent/consequence mechanism.
Utilising uncertainty perception as a common causal mechanism has three
main advantages. First, it robustly links cognition (Tversky & Kahneman 1974;
Daft & Lengel 1986) and behaviour (Ball et al. 1997). Uncertainty perception
as a metacognitive process fulfils two key roles in connecting multiple cognitive
processes and core actions: reflecting knowledge about cognition and regulating
cognition itself. These roles of uncertainty perception have been described in the
design literature by, for example, Gerber & Carroll (2012) who illustrate how
uncertainty perception associated with declarative knowledge about self (sense
of progress, self-belief etc.) and learning progression is affected by prototyping.
Further, authors such as Deken et al. (2012) and Wiltschnig et al. (2013) describe
uncertainty perception as a driver for a range of specific action sub-types, while
Blandin & Brown (1977) and Hult et al. (2004) described it as a driver for overall
activity. Thus uncertainty perception provides a general metacognitive process
that connects to memory and individual experience by incorporating knowledge
about cognition as well as regulating own cognition and directing action.
Second, uncertainty perception can be characterised consistently across
levels (Figure 1) and across the three core actions. In particular, it connects
understanding/knowledge, memory, and perception, to activity progression,
thus bridging cognition and action. Further, as highlighted in Sections 3.2–3.4
uncertainty perception, defined as a general metacognitive process, has been
shown to be an important driver with respect to each of the core actions despite the
different empirical and behavioural foci of design research. The characterisation
of uncertainty perception is explicitly general i.e. the conceptualisation of
uncertainty perception used by Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub (2011) with respect
to information action is analogous to the conceptualisation used by Wiltschnig
et al. (2013) with respect to representation action. Thus uncertainty perception
provides a general mechanism that can be consistently characterised irrespective
of specific behaviour or cognitive process, making it suitable for connecting
multiple core actions associated with different dominant cognitive processes.
Third, uncertainty perception is fundamentally linked to an individual’s
understanding of a situation (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), making it theoretically
consistent with the cognitive processes identified with respect to the core actions.
In summary, uncertainty perception thus forms a key antecedent/consequence
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mechanism consistent with descriptions in the literature (Bedny & Karwowski
2004; Bedny & Harris 2005) and connects the three core actions, shaping their
selection and sequential combination, and subsequently driving overall design
activity.
An important distinction here is between the general concept of uncertainty,
extant in a situation (extant uncertainty), and the metacognitive concept
connected to an individual, in the sense of making him/her feel unsure
or unconfident (uncertainty perception). Extant uncertainty can stem from
organisational and social issues, technology development, or other aspects of a
situation (Calantone & Rubera 2012), and is a characteristic feature of design
work, linked to the unknown nature of the task outcome (Tracey & Hutchinson
2016). In addition there are a number of other concepts related to extant
uncertainty, such as, ambiguity, equivocality, or ‘lack of knowledge’ (Suss &
Thomson 2012). Ambiguity defines a situation where the available information or
problemdescription does not give a consistent or coherent picture (Ellsberg 2001),
while equivocality describes the possibility of there being multiple or conflicting
interpretations of a situation (Daft, Lengel & Trevino 1987). However, before
an individual can act on any such manifest concepts, they must perceive and
process them with respect to their own understanding of the situation (Tversky
& Kahneman 1974; Evans & Stanovich 2013), thus they are transformed into
uncertainty perception. Manifest concepts such as extant uncertainty or lack
of knowledge only affect activity if they are perceived by the designer via this
metacognitive awareness (Schraw & Dennison 1994; Ball & Christensen 2009).
Uncertainty perception describes the mental state of an individual, such as a
designer, who faces uncertainty and may thus feel unconfident in their activity
(Kreye 2016). Uncertainty perception thus provides a bridge from the literature
that generally highlights extant uncertainty (or other manifest concepts) as an
important feature of designwork (Tracey&Hutchinson 2016) to an explicit causal
mechanism linking behaviour and cognition in relation to design activity. This
understanding of uncertainty perception is adopted throughout this work.
Uncertainty perception reflects how the designer understands a situation
with respect to their personality, experience, and other personal characteristics
(Kreye 2016; Tracey & Hutchinson 2016) and does not necessarily accurately
reflect the level of extant uncertainty. Uncertainty perception thus captures an
individual’s understanding translated into an antecedent through perception,
based on their own experience (Christensen & Ball 2016a,b; Tracey &Hutchinson
2016). This has been captured in the design domain where design activity is
described as a chain of decisions made under uncertainty where knowledge
develops (Beheshti 1993; Dorst & Cross 2001; Wiltschnig et al. 2013). Similarly,
uncertainty perception has been highlighted in the wider product development
literature as an important driver of activity (Daft & Lengel 1986; O’Connor &
Rice 2013; Kreye 2016). Uncertainty perception thus forms a unifyingmechanism
with respect to cognition and the core actions (Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub 2011;
Deken et al. 2012; Gerber & Carroll 2012).
In the design literature a number of studies have connected the progression
of specific action sub-types to uncertainty perception (Wiltschnig et al. 2013).
Bringing the literature together, uncertainty perception has been separately
described as a driver of specific information (Borlund 2003; Daalhuizen &
Badke-Schaub 2011), knowledge-sharing (Deken et al. 2012), and representation
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actions (Wiltschnig et al. 2013). In addition, a small number of works have pointed
to the role of uncertainty perception in directing the progression of specific action
sub-types, such as stimulating recall within sketching (Scrivener et al. 2000).
Descriptions of uncertainty perception in the design literature have two main
limitations. First, the effect of uncertainty perception as a driver of activity has
only been studied with respect to the progression of specific action sub-types (e.g.
sketching). This is in contrast to formalisms where wider activity progression and
connection across the core actions has been highlighted (Daft & Lengel 1986;
Hult et al. 2004). Second, in design, uncertainty perception has been characterised
predominantly as a unitarywholewith no subdivision and using a binary existence
scale. For example, Ball & Christensen (2009) treat uncertainty perception via
binary schema i.e. either present/not present (Ball & Christensen 2009; Ball,
Onarheim & Christensen 2010) or low/high (Wiltschnig et al. 2013; Christensen
& Ball 2016a,b). This is in contrast to the multi-faceted, scalar conceptualisation
found in themanagement literature (Hurley, Kosenko& Brashers 2011; O’Connor
& Rice 2013) and necessary for understanding themultiple factors influencing the
core actions. Thus, important insights can, and need to, be drawn fromother fields
such as psychology and management.
Given these considerations the impact of uncertainty perception on action
varies in two main dimensions: level and nature. The level of uncertainty
perception describes the overall amount of the perceived lack of understanding
(Kreye et al. 2012). Here, an individual can perceive uncertainty anywhere from
ignorance (where design factors are unknown or unknowable) to certainty
(where the designer perceives no uncertainty regarding the design task). The
level of uncertainty perception should reduce over the duration of the design
activity (Wynn, Grebici & Clarkson 2011; Yu et al. 2016) because the designer’s
understanding of the development task gradually increases as interdependencies
are clarified (Yu et al. 2016). As suggested by the recent work of Christensen &
Ball (2016a,b) the dynamic interplay between changing uncertainty perception
and action drive the overall progression of design activity.
The nature of uncertainty perception arises from its heterogeneous character
in design (Kleinsmann & Valkenburg 2008; O’Connor & Rice 2013). This
describes the perception of different uncertainty types as drivers of activity, by
shaping action selection and sequential progression. For example, uncertainty can
arise from the external environment (Kleinsmann&Valkenburg 2008) or the level
of technical innovation in the design task (O’Connor & Rice 2013). Numerous
works have illustrated how different uncertainty types, or combinations of types,
influence activity in distinct ways (Bstieler 2005; Heavey & Simsek 2013). In
design, all types can be expected to shape activity (Garcia 2005), particularly as
designers often face multi-faceted problems where they must deal with team,
organisation, and process issues in addition to pure product considerations
(Kleinsmann & Valkenburg 2008). Specifically, Bstieler (2005) and Biazzo (2009)
highlight how activity is typically driven by one or two types in any given
situation. Thus the composite perception of these uncertainty types i.e. the
nature of uncertainty perception, is an important determinant of design activity
progression.
Finally, although uncertainty perception provides a robust and theoretically
consistent link between the core actions underpinning design activity, it is not
necessarily the only possible unifying element. However, due to the extent of the
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empirical and theoretical support for uncertainty perception, it provides an ideal
unifying antecedent/consequence mechanism for the proposed UDA model.
5. The Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) Model
This section describes the proposedUDAmodel.We first synthesise the three core
actions together with uncertainty perception before describing the progression
through the UDA model.
5.1. UDA Elements
The UDA model takes its starting point in the designer’s uncertainty perception.
Uncertainty perception forms the antecedent (i.e. causal mechanism) for activity
in the UDA model because it motivates the three core actions described below.
It connects activity to cognition via the core actions, with respect to memory
and experience (Oxman 1990). It forms a metacognitive process that deals with
an individuals’ knowledge about their own cognition as well as regulation of
cognition itself (Schraw & Dennison 1994). It is important to note that although
current literature typically highlights the drive to reduce uncertainty perception
over time (Ball & Christensen 2009; Yu et al. 2016), UDA uses the more neutral
modify. This distinction is made to highlight the fact that actions can both
increase or decrease uncertainty perception (Nagai & Gero 2012). However,
overall reduction is to be expected over the whole duration of the design process
(Hult et al. 2004). Uncertainty perception can be varied and complex because it
includes level and nature, and captures uncertainty perception about the design
itself as well as wider organisational issues (Kleinsmann & Valkenburg 2008).
In combination, the level and nature of uncertainty perception can determine
action selection and progression in terms of information, knowledge sharing, and
representation. Further, changes in any of these dimensions (level, nature or both)
form the trigger for shifting between elements within the UDA model. Thus the
UDA model allows for the dynamic interaction between changing uncertainty
perception and action progression, providing a unifying foundation for describing
aggregate activity.
In information action a designer seeks to modify their uncertainty perception
by working with data parts and their manipulation. This can be through
e.g. collection, recording, reviewing, filing, archiving, seeking, and requesting
(Blandin & Brown 1977; Robinson 2010b). Individual designers process this
via reasoning or learning resulting in a new uncertainty perception state (Daft
& Lengel 1986; Aurisicchio et al. 2010). The dominant cognitive process is
information processing (Song et al. 2005). Examples of information action
include, searching for data online (Aurisicchio et al. 2010), or providing/asking
for specific data (Robinson 2010a).
In knowledge-sharing action a designer seeks to modify their uncertainty
perception by exchanging knowledge expressed with respect to their understand-
ing and beliefs to e.g. develop a shared understanding with the design team
(Daft & Lengel 1986; Dong 2005; Kleinsmann & Valkenburg 2008). Individual
designers process this exchange resulting in a new uncertainty perception state.
The dominant cognitive process is social cognition (Chiu et al. 2006). Examples
of knowledge-sharing action include, expressing belief modified knowledge in
conversation (Dong 2005), or creative exploration (Christensen & Ball 2016a,b).
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Figure 2. The UDA model linking internal metacognitive uncertainty perception
(red) and cognitive processing (grey), and externally enacted information,
knowledge-sharing, and representation actions (black). As a whole, the UDA model
composes one ‘building block’ denoted by Note 2 in Figure 1.
In representation action a designer seeks to modify their uncertainty
perception by the manipulation of external information representations through,
for example, computational simulation (Lamarra & Dunphy 1998). Individual
designers process this by reflecting on the external representation in relation to
their internal simulations (Wilson 2002; Evans 2008). The dominant cognitive
process is embodied cognition (Wilson 2002). Examples of representation action
include, sketching (Schön &Wiggins 1992), prototyping (Gerber & Carroll 2012),
or gesturing (Cash & Maier 2016).
In order to describe activity fully, behaviour and cognitionmust be considered
in unity. Thus each of the core actions are connected to cognitive processing (Evans
2008), which allows for reflective practice (Schön & Wiggins 1992), reasoning,
sense-making (Aurisicchio et al. 2010), creative imagination (Hatchuel & Weil
2002), and mental simulation (Wiltschnig et al. 2013). Cognitive processing
includes both fast and un-deliberate, as well as slow and deliberate processes
(Evans & Stanovich 2013), however, such decomposition is not necessary for the
purposes of the proposedmodel. In particular, there is a relative lack of unanimity
across formalisms of human processing in the psychology literature (Francis et al.
2009), as well as their application in the design domain. Thus by combining these
elements the UDA model captures the whole cycle from uncertainty perception
through behaviour to cognition, as a single unity of activity.
The UDA model is illustrated in Figure 2. Here the internal world of
the designer (including uncertainty perception, cognitive processing, and the
reflective link between them) and the external world where action can be
observed (including information, knowledge-sharing, and representation actions)
are explicitly connected via causal links to produce an overall unity between
behaviour and cognition. As such, the model cannot be decomposed to only
action or cognition if an overall understanding of activity is to be achieved.
Thus, the model must be considered as a whole system. Actions are denoted in
black – these include the three core actions as the common generic behaviours
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from which higher-level tasks and activities are composed; cognitive processing
is denoted in grey – this comprises the cognitive processes that underpin the
core actions, as well as the other systems making up an individual’s cognitive
framework; finally, uncertainty perception is denoted in red – this represents
themetacognitive antecedence/consequencemechanism linked to understanding,
that connects action and cognition. These elements together make up the unitary
action/cognition building blocks at the foundation of activity (Section 2).
All of these elements together make up the foundation of activity, and are
couched within the wider context of the situation and the designer (Briggs 2006).
A full deconstruction of the different contextual factors that influence activity is
beyond the scope of this work and forms a significant body of study in its own right
(Bedny & Harris 2005). The context can include the wider social context (Dong
2005), discipline (Yilmaz et al. 2015), and personal experience (Christensen&Ball
2016a,b). Furthermore, the individual designer links to the wider group (design
team and organisation) (Christensen & Ball 2016a,b; Kreye 2016). However, all
actions in the UDAmodel are undertaken by an individual (and can all be carried
out in any setting, in a group or alone), building on the core understanding
of design activity as the unity of individual behaviour and cognition. Group
dynamics can be understood by, for example, modelling the actions of each
individual and then examining their connection and interaction (Garcia 2005). In
this regard it is possible to imagine each individual as semi-autonomous within
a network of connected individuals that act independently but influence each
other through their actions (McCarthy et al. 2006). Alternatively, assessment
of actions or uncertainty perception can be aggregated across a population in
order to identify overall trends or quantitative relationships (Hult et al. 2004).
Thus the individual can be connected to the wider group or system by building
on the UDA model. However, this interaction is not currently well developed
and is substantially beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, deconstructing each
element into its sub-constituents e.g. internal processes underpinning cognition,
or physical processes and specific instantiations making up the core actions, is
also beyond the scope of this work. This is because current formalisms of design
activity do not offer consistently detailed and accepted deconstructions of all
elements.
5.2. UDA progression
The UDA elements are connected in a unitary model describing the synthesis of
behaviour and cognition fundamental to understanding design activity (Bedny
& Karwowski 2004), and cyclical action progression (Engeström 2000). Each
cycle starts with an antecedent change in the designer’s uncertainty perception.
Change in uncertainty perception is used here as a driver for action (Christensen
& Ball 2016a,b) and can be evaluated in absolute or relative terms (Chan, Paletz
& Schunn 2012; Paletz, Chan & Schunn 2017). In reaction to this change in
uncertainty perception the designer enters one of the three action cycles. These
form the behaviour element of the model. The outcomes from this behaviour then
feed into the designer’s cognitive processing system (Bilda & Gero 2007; Evans
2008) where it drives a subsequent change of state in the designer’s uncertainty
perception. Cognitive processing (Evans 2008) and the change in uncertainty
perception form the consequence element in the model and close the cycle. UDA
thus captures the full cycle of action from antecedent to consequence, connecting
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Figure 3.Possible progressions allowed by theUDAmodel, and an example sequence
of actions linked by evolving uncertainty perception (UPn). Here each action cycle
in the sequence is a single iteration of the UDA model and together they form the
foundation for activity as explained in Figure 1.
behaviour and cognition (Bedny & Karwowski 2004), to form the foundation for
understanding design activity. In addition to the action cycles it is also possible
for a designer to simply reflect on their own understanding through a cognitive
processing/uncertainty perception loop.
Each cycle forms a generic building block that can be completed multiple
times, for example, addressing different information sources (Song et al. 2005)
such as searching for specific information on a webpage and then sharing the
interpretation of that information with the team, communication modes (Cash
& Maier 2016), or representation media (Sanders & Stappers 2014). Further,
actions can be directed towards different design goals e.g. ideation or concept
refinement (Yang 2009), or aspects of the design artefact (Gero 1990). The core
actions and uncertainty perception dynamically interact and co-vary to provide
the foundation for describing aggregate activity progression, i.e. the building up
of an overall activity by the sequential connection of multiple unitary action
cycles each encapsulating behaviour and cognition. Thus UDA is able to describe
iterative, dynamic activity via the sequential completion of multiple action cycles.
The sequential progression through the UDA model is illustrated in Figure 3.
This highlights the different possible progressions allowed by themodel, as well as
examples of the features of design work that these describe. Each cycle is initiated
by the current uncertainty perception state (UP1) and endswith a new uncertainty
perception state (UP2). Finally, a simplified abstract illustration is used to show
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the dynamic interaction between changing uncertainty perception and action
progression.
Together the proposed elements and cyclical progression allow for amodel that
offers an integrative understanding of design activity built on a foundation of the
three core actions connected to cognition. This is consistent with current design
activity formalisms. Further, by integrating these elements the UDAmodel is able
to describe the major features of design activity found in the empirical literature.
6. Discussion
Based on the UDA model, suggestions for future research directions in the form
of ‘propositions’ can be derived. This section discusses the proposed UDA model
with regard to its link to the design literature and subsequently suggests three
propositions for future work.
6.1. Link to the design literature
The proposed UDA model extends the design literature by unifying previously
disparate research. In particular, it unifies the varied descriptions of the core
actions underpinning design activity. More generally it explains the gradual
resolution of uncertainty perception related to the creation of a design artefact
(Hult et al. 2004). Further, it extends prior descriptions of uncertainty perception
as a driver of specific action sub-types and connects these in a generic model of
design activity progression built on the sequential selection and combination of
the three core actions. The UDA model hence formalises descriptions of design
activity, consistent with Activity Theory as well as extant empirical studies of
designing (Eris et al. 2014; Crilly 2015). The model’s applicability is further
supported by its consistency with prior empirical and theoretical work in the
design literature. This illustrates theUDAmodel’s robustness in linking behaviour
and cognition, and its ability to integrate the three core actions underpinning
design activity. Finally, the dynamic interaction between changing uncertainty
perception and activity progression, driven by the action cycles, highlights the
potential for explaining design activity from antecedent to consequence.
Each element included in theUDAmodel constitutes a distinct area of research
in design. Although further decomposition is possible, current descriptions
are not consistent across all elements. This bounds the scope of the proposed
model without prescribing sub-categorisations. However, the proposed model
does define the overall nature of each core action, based on its dominant
cognitive process (Bedny & Karwowski 2004), and thus guides where such
sub-categorisations could be included. For example, Eris’s (2002) breakdown of
questioning types offers a specific decomposition of one aspect of knowledge-
sharing action. Other examples of knowledge-sharing sub-categorisations are
Wasiak et al.’s (2010) breakdown of sharing action or Storga et al.’s (2010)
ontology. It is important to note that theUDAmodel does not point to any specific
sub-categorisations and thus does not preclude or favour one over the other.
Uncertainty perception captures both design specific (e.g. problem/solution)
and wider factors (Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub 2011; Kreye et al. 2011)
characterised in terms of level and nature. Although uncertainty perception
as a unitary whole has been studied in the design domain (Wiltschnig et al.
2013) no taxonomy or decomposition of design-related uncertainty perception
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exists. For example, Kleinsmann & Valkenburg (2008) highlight organisational
sources of uncertainty, while others focus on social issues (Chiu et al. 2006),
or specific aspects of design understanding (Storga et al. 2010). Further, no
cohesive description of uncertainty perception exists in the design literature
below the description currently used in the UDAmodel, which can be influenced
by experience (Demirbaş & Demirkan 2003), situational factors (Kreye et al.
2012) and personality (Kreye 2016). In contrast, the management literature offers
taxonomies of uncertainty as described, for example, by O’Connor & Rice (2013).
Further work is needed to integrate these taxonomies in the design literature and
determine the causal relationship with action selection in design. Thus, as with
the core actions, the lack of a cohesive model of uncertainty perception means
that it is not possible to decompose this element or its impact on design activity
beyond what is described in the proposed model.
Together the elements of the UDA model support its ability to answer
empirical and theoretical questions raised in the design literature e.g. how the
interface between conversation and gesture jointly resolve uncertainty perception
(Luck 2013), how designers progress through a design task by combining distinct
units of action in a directed sequence (Christensen & Ball 2016a,b; Cash &
Gonçalves 2017), or how co-evolution can be connected to directed action
(Lassoet al. 2016; Cash & Gonçalves 2017). In particular, Cash & Kreye (2017)
begin to empirically examine the utility of the UDAmodel in their recent protocol
studies. However, significant questions remain as elaborated in the following
section.
6.2. Propositions and further work
Based on the UDA model, three propositions can be formulated that provide
concrete claims for testing in, for example, subsequent empirical studies (Wacker
1998), and provide directions for future research. First, a central feature of
the model is uncertainty perception as the driver of the three core actions:
information, knowledge sharing, and representation. The proposed UDA model
extends descriptions in the design literature by explicitly stating the causal
relationship between uncertainty perception and the core actions. Uncertainty
perception can drive action selection and combinatory progression. Specifically,
uncertainty perception generally motivates and mediates progression across
actions (Calantone & Rubera 2012) and is linked to progression within specific
instantiations of actions, such as sketching (Scrivener et al. 2000), and prototyping
(Gerber & Carroll 2012). Thus we propose uncertainty perception as a major
driver for the dynamic interaction between the core actions and higher-level
activity progression, encapsulated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Uncertainty perception is a driver and antecedent of design activity,
connecting progression across information, knowledge-sharing, and representation
actions.
This proposition refines and extends existing descriptions in the design
literature in two main ways. First, it captures the varied role of uncertainty
perception as a causal driver of design activity in terms of action progression.
This connects higher-level research on aggregate activity (Hult et al. 2004) to
studies at the action level (Christensen & Ball 2016a,b). It thus formally integrates
fragmented descriptions of the effect of uncertainty perception as a cause of design
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activity progression. Second, it points to the need for further research exploring
the role of uncertainty perception in connecting the multiple levels associated
with design activity (Section 2). For example, this proposition points to the
connection between activity level progression and fundamental characterisations
of uncertainty perception and action level response. The UDA model thus
provides a key bridge between the varied formalisms of design activity and wider
activity related literature in the management and innovation research domains,
highlighted as a key challenge for design research by the recent works of Luo
(2015) and Papalambros (2015).
Second, the effect of uncertainty perception on design activity can be
conceptualised based on its level and nature. As described in Section 4, level
of uncertainty perception describes the overall amount of the perceived lack of
understanding, while nature details the perception of different uncertainty types.
Together, the level and nature of uncertainty perception affect action selection and
progression with respect to the core actions: information, knowledge sharing, and
representation. Changes in level and nature also influence how the core actions
are realised in practice (Omta & de Leeuw 1997). Further research is needed
to characterise how level and nature of uncertainty perception (and changes
thereof) determine action selection and across-action progression. Recent work
of Cash&Gonçalves (2017) shows that such examination is possible at the unitary
action/cognition level conceptualised in the UDAmodel. It can be expected that a
change in the level, nature or both of uncertainty perceptionmay cause a designer
to move from, for example, information action to knowledge-sharing action. For
example, one combination of different uncertainty types may favour information
action over the other two core actions captured in the UDA model. However,
the exact impact of these differing changes is not clear. This is encapsulated in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Change in uncertainty perception, characterised by level and nature,
determines activity progression, in terms of action selection and combination across
information, knowledge-sharing, and representation actions.
This proposition contributes to the design literature by decomposing the effect
of uncertainty perception beyond current characterisations. This allows for more
fine grained understanding of designers’ reactions depending on their perception
of the situation (Daalhuizen & Badke-Schaub 2011), and organisational setting
(Kreye 2016). It thus allows design researchers to determine the specific effect
of uncertainty perception on design activity in terms of action selection and
combinatory progression.
Finally, the UDA model suggests that it is the combined effect of action
selection and combinatory progression that determines overall design activity
progression, and thus design outcome. This follows prior conceptualisations of
design that place activity at the heart of performance, but extends them by
integrating the three core actions in a single model. Specifically, prior research
has highlighted the individual importance of information (Wasiak et al. 2010),
knowledge sharing (Kleinsmann et al. 2012), and representation (Bilda & Gero
2007) on design outcome, with little or no integration between them. The UDA
model offers a means of bringing together descriptions of design activity and its
impact on outcome. The connection between uncertainty perception and design
outcome is encapsulated in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3. The progression of uncertainty perception (level and nature) and
activity determines the design outcome.
This proposition contributes to the design literature by connecting the
effect of uncertainty perception and subsequent action selection/progression
to design outcome. This integrates antecedent, behaviour, and consequence
elements in a single model in the design context (Oliver 1980; Miltenberger
2011). This complements and extends prior works that have focused on the
antecedent/behaviour relationship between uncertainty perception and specific
instantiations of the different core actions (Scrivener et al. 2000). Further, the
focused nature of prior studies of uncertainty perception and action in the
design context mean that direct links between overall activity progression and
overall outcome have been difficult to characterise. Thus the UDAmodel enables
researchers to understand complexmotivation driven activities in terms of generic
units, the combination of which underpin overall activity progression. In this way
researchers are better able to target support for these core actions or decompose
overall activity progression patterns in order to better understandwhere andwhen
design support is needed.
7. Conclusion
This paper aimed to propose a cohesive model of design activity as a basis
for unifying the design activity literature and as a foundation for future theory
building in this area. This connects the diverse empirical and theoretical works
in the design domain already exploring many aspects of design activity; and
seeks to formalise a description of design activity as a goal directed system
where cognition, behaviour, and motivation are integrated, with respect to the
‘bringing-into-being’ of a design artefact. Based on an analytical conceptual
approach the Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) model was proposed. This
combines three core actions (information action, knowledge-sharing action, and
representation action), and their associated cognitive processes via the designers’
uncertainty perception, to explain the progression of overall design activity. The
theoretical basis of the model was described and its practical relevance discussed
with respect to the wider design literature. Themodel brings together a wide range
of prior descriptions of design activity via the core actions, and connects these
into a dynamic system via cognition and uncertainty perception. This provides a
cohesive understanding of design activity as built on the sequential combination
of fundamental actions.
The UDA model delivers three main contributions to design research. First,
it offers a unifying description of design activity synthesising the core actions
and uncertainty perception in a single model, with a consistent link to cognition
in line with underlying Activity Theory. The three core actions further provide
a platform for developing greater commonality in research on design activity,
comparing insights from existing formalisms, and directing future typologies
on the sub-types defining each of the core actions. Second, the proposed UDA
model offers a causal explanation of design activity progression in terms of action
selection and sequential combination, with respect to the commonmechanism of
uncertainty perception. This completes the antecedent–behaviour–consequence
requirements lacking in prior formalisms and describes a ‘complete’ framework of
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design activity. Third, this research proposes important guidelines and directions
for future research that will further theory development in the design literature.
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